CIRCULATION COPY 1

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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General Burchinal Stresses USEUCOM Status: Strong U. S. Presence Is Essential To NATO

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Air Force General David A. Burchinal discussed the current status of USEUCOM and its contribution to the defense of NATO, May 17, before the House Committee on Appropriations.

At the onset of his statement, Gen. Burchinal asserted: "We firmly believe that a strong and continuing United States military presence is essential to the NATO Alliance, to the security of North America and to peace in Europe."

In broad outline, the general sketched the threat faced by USEUCOM and NATO countries, reviewed the forces in Europe and their readiness, and explained how USEUCOM is working with U.S. allies "to improve their capability so they can assume a greater share of the defense burden."

Threat to Europe

Discussing the threat to Europe and the U.S. by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, the four-star general said:

"Beginning about 1965, it became apparent that the Soviets had begun a priority program to improve their strategic offensive and defensive posture. Concurrently, they made intensive efforts to increase the capability and readiness of the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact air, ground and naval forces for conventional warfare.

"The primary mission of the military forces of the USSR and its allies," he continued, "is to protect the Soviet homeland, to guarantee the inviolability of the entire Soviet Bloc under the Brezhnev Doctrine, to cast doubt on the efficacy of the NATO shield and thereby to increase Soviet influence in the affairs of Western Europe, and to promote Moscow's expansionist objectives in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East. We have seen positive indicators—in 1953 in East Germany, in 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia—of Soviet readiness to employ military force to maintain the Communist system established within the captive nations of Eastern Europe during and following World War II. Outside Continental Europe, we are now witnessing the employment of the USSR's rapidly growing naval power and, to some extent, her air power, in the pursuit of Kremlin goals . . ."

Cites Specifics

The general then cited some specifics:

"The ground force threat to NATO Europe consists of over 160 Warsaw Pact divisions, of which more than two-thirds are Soviet. The Warsaw Pact ground forces are well-prepared for either nuclear or conventional warfare. . . .

"Warsaw Pact air operations against Allied Command Europe could be carried out by some 6,000 tactical fighters, light bombers, tactical reconnaissance aircraft and medium jet bombers based in the Pact Forward Area and western USSR. . . .

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

GROWING SUPPORT ON THE HILL. The Jobs for Veterans program is receiving strong and growing support in the Congress with more than 100 Representatives and Senators from both parties pledging full cooperation with President Nixon's program. National JFV Chairman James F. Oates Jr., left, goes over the program with House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R.-Mich.). Rep. Ford has initiated a drive in his home district of Grand Rapids to help veterans find employment when they return home.

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"To facilitate air defense of Warsaw Pact territory and enhance offensive capabilities to penetrate NATO defenses, the Pact nations have many thousands of pieces of ground-based military electronics equipment in the East European forward area—the densest and most sophisticated electronic environment in the world. . . .

"The naval threat to NATO Europe includes the Black Sea, Baltic and Northern Fleets, plus the forces from these fleets regularly deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. These naval forces have more than 150 operational major surface combatants and about 250 operational submarines. . . .

Soviet Buildup

"For the U.S. European Command, the Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean is of major significance. The initial Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean in 1963 and 1964 was primarily for the purpose of 'showing the flag' and for psychological effect on the littoral governments and populations. Since the Arab-Israeli war, however, the naval force in the Mediterranean has been built up to an average strength of some 40 to 50 units—with peaks much higher."

Gen. Burchinal stressed: "The strategic missile threat to NATO Europe is posed primarily by some 600 medium and intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers at sites in western USSR. This strategic missile threat is one for which we in Europe have no truly comparable force.

"With respect to the intercontinental missile threat, it is our view that the USSR is attempting to gain clear strategic advantage so as to weaken the viability of the U.S. deterrent force."

Threat Summary

The USEUCOM deputy commander-in-chief summarized the threat accordingly:

"I believe that Soviet policies and objectives are aimed at changing the strategic offensive/defensive power balance in order to exploit their current and growing conventional superiority in the European area. Should the Soviets gain confidence in their ability to deter resort by the West to the use of nuclear weapons in response to massive conventional aggression in Europe, new options would open, including the threat of employment of the USSR's and [Warsaw] Pact's powerful conventional forces to achieve political aims. I think that as Soviet and strategic and conventional power mounts, the Kremlin will consider that the risks to them in such expansionist moves progressively are decreasing.

NATO Vs. Warsaw Pact

"In terms of existing ground divisions of all categories," he emphasized, "the Warsaw Pact enjoys a superiority of over twice the number available to our NATO forces. The preponderance of Pact ground forces is particularly significant in the Central Region. While we are generally a match for the Pact in APC's in terms of tanks, the Pact has better than a 2-to-1 advantage with the in-place forces. The Pact has about a third more artillery in place than NATO. NATO plans to increase its tactical aircraft strength in the Central Region during a build-up, but even this substantial gain will not fully overcome the Pact's 50 per cent quantitative superiority in tactical aircraft strength.

"It is significant to note," he said, "that the United States' contribution of army forces in Europe contained in the NATO totals amounts to four-and-one-third divisions and two armored cavalry regiments in place, with some increase after build-up based on today's readiness posture. In regard to the U.S. Air Force contribution, we have more than 400 tactical aircraft in the Central Region during peacetime, and a planned augmentation capability to expand this number. Essentially all of NATO's air augmentation is provided by the United States. Over-all, U.S. forces on hand in Central Europe in peacetime represents about 25 per cent of NATO's total force."

USEUCOM Forces

Gen. Burchinal noted that USEUCOM's primary mission is to maintain the readiness of our assigned forces to meet the United States commitment to NATO and be prepared to protect the interests of the United States anywhere in our assigned area. He said that, for this purpose, the command has a total military population of about 240,000, mostly Army.

He then reviewed the readiness of USEUCOM forces, which, he said, "Not all are currently considered fully combat ready." He explained, "There are many reasons for this, including our share of reductions the Services have been forced to make, lower assigned personnel strengths and skill levels, funding constraints such as less money for training and exercises, and the priority of Vietnam requirements."

Considering each Service separately, the general said: "In U.S. Army Europe, a number of units have reported they are below their programmed strength, are short the required critical skills or do not have the required personnel distribution by category or grade. . . .

"Our Army forces are not only short in the number of men; the turn-over rate is also high. This shortage and turbulence is further compounded by a shortage in some specialties and grade imbalances in middle grade officers and senior enlisted grades. These shortages, combined with the austere funding, have a direct impact on the other measurement categories of training and equipment readiness."

Skill Shortages

Concerning U.S. Navy Forces in Europe, the general stressed: "Our naval component also has personnel problems, however, these are primarily shortages in specific critical skills at the petty officer level rather than shortage of manpower. These critical skill shortages plus the lack of readily-available repair parts for the aging fleet, combine to degrade combat readiness of the fleet."

U.S. Air Force Europe, he said, is converting one wing from F-100 to F-111 aircraft. "Remaining shortages," he added, "are temporary in nature and do not constitute a trend or chronic deficiency."

Gen. Burchinal said he did not wish to convey that such deficiencies prevent us from the performance of USEUCOM's primary combat mission. "We still maintain," he said, "a very respect-

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Called Nation's 'Absolute Minimum'

U. S. Air Force Requests Aircraft, Missile Funds

Lieutenant General Otto J. Glasser, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, presented the Air Force's Fiscal Year 1972 Aircraft and Missile Procurement request May 4 to the House Armed Services Committee and cautioned that "without these procurement programs, the Nation's security will be subject to undue jeopardy."

Gen. Glasser emphasized in his statement that the request "contains programs which have been validated through severe scrutiny and careful trade-offs within the Department of Defense."

He noted that the 1972 proposed procurement program reflects the Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnamization program with an attendant draw down in forces, and it continues a downward trend of several years duration.

The three-star general said the downward trend "is even more meaningful when considered in terms of the decreasing buying power of the dollar.

"These doubly reduced dollars are, of course," he continued, "buying smaller quantities of the systems necessary to carry out assigned Air Force missions."

Lowest Since 1935

He said the request provided for the procurement of the smallest number of aircraft in any one year since 1935. "Should our [aircraft] losses in FY 1972 match our experience of recent years, the number of aircraft requested will not even match our attrition. The quantities requested are small by any standard, and they are certainly far less than the quantities we would prefer. Quite simply, the numbers in this request are the absolute minimum that we believe this Nation must have," he stressed.

Gen. Glasser said the basis for the judgment was the growing capabilities of "our potential enemies," and specifically cited the Soviet Union and China. "Throughout the world," he said, "we see the possibility of insurrections and incursions—any one of which could potentially require some degree of U.S. involvement.

"On the positive side," he acknowledged, "there is the possibility of negotiated arms limitations through the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) . . .

TABLE I
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
FISCAL YEAR 1972 AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT ESTIMATES
(In Millions of Dollars)

		ESTIMATE
COMBAT AIRCRAFT		
A-7D	Attack	$ 205.2
F-4E	Fighter	142.9
F-111	Tactical Fighter (Over Target and Proof Testing)	165.4
F-15	International Fighter	70.6
RF-4C	Reconnaissance	42.3
		$ 626.4
AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT		
C-5A	Cargo/Transport (Prior Year Unfunded Deficiencies)	$ 357.2
C-130H	Cargo/Transport	40.6
		$ 397.8
TRAINER AIRCRAFT		
T-41D	Pilot Trainer	$ .1
T-X	Navigational Trainer	11.5
		$ 11.6
MODIFICATIONS		307.0
SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS		428.3
OTHER SUPPORT		833.8
TOTAL DIRECT PROGRAM		2,923.9
LESS ESTIMATED AVAILABLE FINANCING		25.8
NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY REQUIRED		$ 2,897.5

"However," he cautioned, "we cannot imperil the defense of this country by unilaterally reducing our military strength because of optimistic hopes. Therefore, our proposed procurement program seeks only to enhance the environment for the negotiations by maintaining our present military capabilities relative to our primary opponents."

Aircraft Procurement

Gen. Glasser then discussed the aircraft total direct procurement program for FY 1972, and noted that it was about $650 million less than the FY 1971 request. He added that the reduced program would permit the maintenance of only minimum required capabilities. He said that 188 aircraft were to be procured under the proposed budget.

Missile Procurement

Gen. Glasser then launched into the Air Force Missile procurement request for FY 1972, noting that the request was larger than the requests of recent years—due primarily to survivability improvements for land-based ICBMs, thereby assuring their effectiveness for another decade.

"Funds for the programmed buy of SRAM missiles," he explained, "and first buys of the Maverick and AIM-9L Sidewinder also account for a portion of the larger request. . . . The request also includes funds for additional Shrike antiradiation missiles, target drones, spares and repair parts, and other support equipment.

"The total new obligational authority," he said, "for missile procurement in FY 1972 is approximately $1.94 billion, compared with $1.53 billion in FY 1971 and $1.49 billion in FY 1970."

The FY 1972 budget request contains $571.5 million for Minuteman, $549.9 million of which will be used for the next increment of missiles.

Minuteman Force Modernization—

(Continued On Page 4)

Officers Named 'White House Fellows'

Four military officers—two U.S. Army and two U.S. Marine Corps—are among 16 young men and women who have been appointed to serve as White House Fellows for 1971-72. The new Fellows, the seventh such group to serve since the program was established, will take up their duties as special assistants to members of the White House staff and members of the Cabinet in September.

The military officers named are: Army Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Stephenson, Army Major Robert Allen Dey, and Marine Majors John S. Grinalds and Robert C. McFarlane.

The Fellows were selected from approximately 1,000 applicants for the program, which is designed to provide rising young leaders from business, the universities and a variety of professions, a firsthand exposure to the top level of the Federal Government.

Following their year in Washington, White House Fellows return to their respective professions and communities.

TABLE II
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
FISCAL YEAR 1972 MISSILE PROCUREMENT ESTIMATES
(In Millions of Dollars)

	TYPE	ESTIMATES
Minuteman II/III (LGM-30F/G)	Strategic ICBM	$ 571.5
Minuteman Force Modernization		270.5
Shrike (AGM-45A)	Anti-Radar	11.3
Maverick (AGM-65A)	Air-to-Ground	74.0
SRAM (AGM-69A)	Air-to-Ground	204.4
Sparrow (AIM-7F)	Air-to-Air	10.5
Sidewinder (AIM-9L)	Air-to-Air	4.0
Target Drones		6.9
Modifications		119.2
Spares and Repair Parts		63.3
Other Support Equipment and Facilities		608.8
TOTAL DIRECT PROGRAM/NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY REQUIRED		$ 1,944.4

FUNDS NEEDED

(Continued From Page 3)

$270.5 million has been requested for Minuteman Force modernization, consisting of three separate programs: Basic Force Modernization (a modification of Minuteman I launch and launch-control facilities to accept Minuteman II and III missiles); Upgrade Silo Program (providing increased pre-launch survivability); and Command Data Buffer program (a system, still in development, that will provide the capability to quickly and remotely upgrade information for Minuteman missiles).

Missile Modifications

The missile modification program will provide funds to correct deficiencies discovered in operational missiles, to eliminate safety hazards, and to improve performance, capability and reliability. The FY 1972 missile modifications request is $119.2 million, down nearly one-third from the $206 million requested in FY 1971, due in large part to the transfer of some Minuteman modifications into the Minuteman Force modernization program.

The Missile Spares and Repair Parts program procures replacement equipment and initial and replenishment spares to support the current and projected Air Force missile inventory. The FY 1972 request is $63.3 million, $41.9 million of which is allocated for initial spares, which includes $1.5 million for replacement equipment, and $21.4 million for replenishment spares.

The FY 1972 request contains $608.8 million for other missile support equipment, a category which includes several programs which do not logically fall into other groupings contained in the Missile Procurement request. The category covers some space activity plus other programs of a highly classified nature.

Summary

At the close of his statement, Gen. Glasser summarized his remarks:

"The Aircraft and Missile Procurement program for FY 1972 totals $4,866.9 million in direct program cost, with $2,922.5 million for aircraft procurement and $1,944.4 million for missiles. This is a reduction of $197.1 million from the FY 1971 budget for the same purposes. Realistically speaking, the program is even further reduced by the impact of inflation. We believe this amount, budgeted as detailed in the request, will provide a minimum level of confidence that we can meet our worldwide obligations and maintain the credibility of our deterrent forces."

New Project Is Tested For Passport Applications

A test project, permitting passport applications to be submitted through select U.S. Post Offices, is being expanded to other areas of the country.

The program, which began last July at post offices in the Detroit area, Houston and Midland, Texas, and in eight Connecticut cities, was termed by officials as "highly successful," and will be continued and further expanded in those areas.

According to a U.S. State Department announcement, the initial phase of the expansion plan began May 17, when the apply-by-mail service became available in seven Massachusetts cities. By mid-June, the announcement said, the program will be expanded to 61 other cities in Massachusetts, New York, California and Minnesota.

The expanded program is designed to provide greater convenience for the American traveler and reduce workload at the Department of State's Passport Office and field agencies, as well as at Federal and State courts.

Sharp increase in travel abroad by Americans, spokesmen pointed out, caused new passport applications to rise from 1.1 million in 1964 to over 2 million this year.

Adjudication and issuance of passports, as distinct from the acceptance of applications, continue to be the responsibility of the Department of State's Passport Office in Washington, and its 10 field Passport Agencies in major cities of the United States.

RETENTION FACTOR

Family Separation Allowances Are Explained

To make an unaccompanied tour of duty overseas less of a financial burden, the Congress authorized, in 1963, the payment of a new allowance for families —called the Family Separation Allowance (FSA).

Actually, there are two types of FSAs.

If a serviceman overseas must maintain a "home" because Government bachelor quarters are not available, and dependents are not permitted during the overseas tour, then he may collect FSA Type I. This allowance is payable to all members of the armed forces with dependents, regardless of grade. The amount of this FSA is same as the basic allowance for quarters payable to a member in the same pay grade without dependents.

FSA Type I is an allowance which takes care of some of the added expense to maintain a home for dependents in one location while the serviceman is in another location. It is payable only to those serving overseas or in Alaska.

The second form of Family Separation Allowance, Type II, is designed to take care of those extra expenses such as the furnace, the sump pump, and the dead battery.

Temporary Duty

Servicemen separated from their families for 30 days or more may be eligible for the Type II allowance.

This allowance is payable to members of the armed forces who qualify for it whether they are serving in the United States or overseas. To qualify for the Type II allowance the service member must be an E-4 or higher, with over four years' service, and be entitled to a Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) as a member with dependents.

He must also be serving in an area where dependents are not authorized at Government expense, where they do not live at or near his duty station, or—if he is on TDY—be away from his permanent duty station for 30 or more consecutive days in an area where his dependents do not reside at or near his temporary duty station.

New Laws

In December 1970, President Richard Nixon signed into law three additional FSA measures. These provide for 1. the retroactive payment of a FSA of $30 a month for servicemen and women who served an unaccompanied tour, either TDY over 30 days or a permanent change of station, while their dependents lived with friends or relatives; 2. a similar law effective Jan. 1, 1971, which provides for the payment of a FSA to members serving either stateside or overseas while their families reside in Government housing, and 3. the payment of FSA to families of servicemen who are Prisoners of War or Missing in Action in Southeast Asia.

The FSAs are important benefits for members of the armed forces.

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able capability to provide—with our allies—for the initial defense of Europe; however, it does place us in the position of relying heavily upon rapid and massive augmentation of any sustained action."

He emphasized the qualitative improvements which have been and are being made in our forces as a direct result of past budgetary actions by the Congress, and cited the ongoing conversion of F-100 squadrons to F-4 and F-111 aircraft as significantly increasing our combat capability, as do the A-6A and A-7 aircraft presently operating with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. He also mentioned that Army forces were receiving excellent modern equipment, including new, improved armored reconnaissance vehicles and replacements for M60 tanks in armored cavalry squadrons. Older H-13 and H-34 helicopters, he said, are being replaced with newer OH-58 and UH-1D/H equipment. Additionally, he pointed out that Pershing missile units have completed conversion to improved configurations, and a number of battalions have been equipped with self-propelled versions of the Hawk anti-aircraft missile system, and there are now Chaparral/Vulcan anti-aircraft battalions in the field.

"The combat capability of our Marine forces," he said, "was significantly improved with the deployment of the USS Guam with its amphibious landing craft and vertical assault helo (helicopter) capability.

"There has been," he added, "a marked improvement in the survivability of our Air Forces, both with the introduction of the Chaparral/Vulcan low-level defense systems and the completion of several hundred aircraft shelters in the Central Region."

Problem Areas

Conversely, there were, he continued, some problem areas which continue to impair combat capability somewhat. "In order to have the capability to accept this augmentation," he said, 'we need more reception air bases for our Air Forces in order to reduce the high-density base utilization now required and to increase survivability. We must have access to the ports, both sea and air, and we must have the men to operate them if we are to move the mass of personnel and great quantities of materiel which is required for any sustained operation. We must have the associated communications capability to provide for direction and supervision of these movements. We must establish the prepositioned equipment for a usable line of communication (LOC) from these ports to the battlefield."

The general asserted that the Sixth Fleet requires increased and improved anti-submarine warfare capability, and said that the U.S. communications network in Europe requires considerable modernization and improvement. Most of these problems, he said, are outgrowths of the current minimal force posture and budgetary constraints, and there are no short-term quick or easy solutions.

Augmentation

"One of the most pressing problems we face in planning for wartime operations," he said, "is the growing need for early augmentation forces from the U.S. Every military force reduction we experience translates into that many more troops which must be brought back to Europe if we are threatened by war, in order to regain our essential fighting capability."

With respect to basing of tactical air forces, Gen. Burchinal said that two major problems faced USEUCOM: 1) Serious overloading of the relatively few air bases we have by wartime augmentation air forces, emphasizing our need for additional bases to support such planned deployments; and, 2) The need for additional bases to provide SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] with flexibility to shift planned deployments to different base areas as situations dictate.

"We plan to make maximum use of all available allied airfields to alleviate these problems," the general stated. "The allied airfields would not be used by U.S. augmentation air forces during peacetime. However, to reduce critical delay in the wartime employment of air forces, these airfields must be maintained during peacetime in a status that would permit their early operational use by U.S. tactical air squadrons, should augmentation of the U.S. European Command be directed. . . .

"The United States," he said, "has surveyed a number of potential 'collocated' bases, nominated by the countries concerned for the collocation of our forces, to determine the facilities that could be made available and what is required on our part.

"While the concept of collated basing with our allies," he explained, "is desirable for dispersal of forces and flexibility of operations, there are certain disadvantages. The distances from these allied bases to existing U.S. main bases complicate resupply and introduce problems in communications for command and control. . . .

"Unless we can preposition some personnel and material on the bases in peacetime, delays in effective utilization at the outbreak of war will occur until personnel and war readiness materiel can be moved to the bases."

France and NATO

Gen. Burchinal said that basic strategic relationships in Europe have been directly affected by the uncertainty of possible French participation as a wartime partner of the west.

"Inability to count on French forces, airspace, facilities and geography in our wartime plans," he stated, "coupled with the neutrality of Austria and Switzerland, effectively cuts NATO into two separate parts; we, therefore, have a clear need for a well-planned system of bases throughout the Mediterranean area. While there are many obstacles to developing such a system in the unsettled political situation that exists in many parts of that area today, there are steps which we can take to improve our position there.

"In view of Soviet submarine activity in the Mediterranean," he continued, "it is essential that we continue to improve our anti-submarine warfare forces in that area. Continuous surveillance of submarines is a key peacetime requirement. It is too late to go searching for them after a war starts.

"In our attempts," he went on, "to create a better basing situation in this region, we have taken a careful look at such possibilities as expanding certain facilities we must have in the Mediterranean to meet a wider range of requirements. Such actions could provide much-needed military and political flexibility.

Spain

"We believe that our excellent port and airfield complex in Spain," the general said, "and our operating rights there enhances considerably our operational effectiveness in Southern Europe and in the Mediterranean. Spain is the key to

military access to that area. . . . The new agreement that went into effect last September guarantees five more years of U.S. tenure in this geographically-critical area. Spain's growing military potential could provide needed assistance in the defense of the Mediterranean.

Since World War II, the general noted, U.S. Military Assistance Programs (MAP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) have bolstered the defense capabilities of the NATO allies, and have helped to a substantial degree in reducing the need for U.S. forces within the European Command. "From 1950 to 1967," he recounted, "more than 12 billion dollars in U.S. military grant aid was furnished to nine NATO countries in Western Europe. All of those countries today sustain their own defense requirements and have, since 1962, purchased over six billion dollars worth of defense articles and services from the United States."

He continued: "Only three NATO countries—Greece, Turkey and Portugal —still receive U.S. grant aid military assistance. . . . For these countries, too, the transition from grant aid to sales is being made as rapidly as possible. . . .

"The cash," he said, "which our other NATO allies pay for their FMS purchases from the United States improves our balance-of-payments position. The funds which are used to finance FMS credits (to Greece, for example) are repaid with interest.

Burden Sharing

The general then referred to a proposal, made in May, 1970, by the NATO Defense Planning Committee, to study Alliance Defense Problems for the 1970s (AD-70), which included a review of resources and identified burden-sharing problems.

"The NATO Defense Planning Committee," Gen. Burchinal said, "meeting in . . . December 1970, endorsed the conclusions of the AD-70 study which identified specific areas of improvements in NATO's conventional deterrent. In addition, 10 European ministers launched a purely European effort to improve their own defense. The program is known as the European Defense Improvement Program EDIP) and consists of:

"—Financial contributions to NATO infrastructure program over five years for aircraft shelters and NATO communications.

"—Force additions/improvements over five years.

"—Military assistance to Turkey is provided by the Federal Republic of Germany."

(The NATO ministers met May 28 to review Defense Program progress.)

Offset Talks

Gen. Burchinal then discussed bilateral offset talks, with the Federal Republic of Germany. "U.S.-FRG offset agreements," he said, "were traditionally based on military procurement in the United States. As German need for U.S. equipment declined, the agreements also included financial arrangements and understandings on financial cooperation. In the negotiations going on for a new agreement beginning in FY 1972, U.S. and FRG officials are considering German measures of direct budgetary support in addition to a considerable amount of military procurement."

Concerning force requirements and the impact of past reductions, Gen. Burchinal said that "Military personnel and cost reductions programs have been underway since 1965, and the pressure for more reductions in Europe has continued through 1970. The basic rationale underlying many past reductions is that we can cut supporting organization, base and facilities without reducing combat effectiveness. But the U.S. European Command is well beyond the point where such a rationale is at all credible. If there were any fat in our programs, it was trimmed long ago.

"Any further reductions," he continued, "will require us to eliminate complete functions and programs, whole base complexes, and major combat units. Such reductions, without corresponding negotiated reductions in Warsaw Pact forces, will inevitably damage our operational effectiveness, our NATO relations, and will bring into serious question the military capability of the Alliance and the U.S. commitment to it. . . . It would seriously undermine the presently agreed —and sound—NATO concept for defense and agreed strategy, as well as destroying its credibility in the eyes of

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SWEARING IN. Retired Air Force Colonel Everett G. Hopson has been appointed Special Assistant for Drug Abuse Control by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Roger T. Kelley. Mr. Hopson, left, is sworn in by Ass't Sec. Kelley as Mrs. Hopson holds the Holy Bible. As Special Assistant for Drug Abuse Control, Mr. Hopson will coordinate, on a DoD-wide basis, the policies and programs needed to control the growing problem of drug abuse. He will work closely with the military services and other Federal agencies concerned with drug problems. While on active duty, Mr. Hopson was an Assistant to the General Counsel, including duties as Executive Officer of the DoD Drug Abuse Control Committee and Executive Officer of the Interdepartmental Action Task Group (Vietnam). (DoD Photo by Frank Hall)

VALOROUS UNIT. The 2nd Battalion (Airmobile), 502nd Infantry Regiment, and its attached unit, the 3rd Platoon, Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion, recently received Valorous Unit Awards in ceremonies at Camp Eagle, Republic of Vietnam. The units were cited, according to the citation, for "extraordinary heroism while engaged in military operations in Nam Hoa District, Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam, during the period April 25, 1970 to May 25, 1970. . . . Unit personnel repeatedly engaged the enemy in fierce, close fighting, . . . assaulted strongly-fortified Communist positions and each time succeeded in routing the enemy and inflicting heavy casualties. . . ." Here, Major General Thomas M. Tarpley, Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), third from right, presents the 2d Battalion's colors with a Valorous Unit Award streamer.

(Official U.S. Army Photo)

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the Soviets and Warsaw Pact. . . .

"Since 1962," he added, "we have made substantial reductions in our military strength in Europe. The current levels are, in my judgment, the absolute minimum needed if we are to maintain credible deterrence and, thereby, hope for a lessening of tensions and the realization of some detente in Europe. To further reduce this force—already weakened by deficiencies in its readiness as we have discussed today—is an open invitation to Soviet and Warsaw Pact adventurism. I believe that this risk directly increases as the Soviets continue their move [to] a position of relative nuclear parity with the United States.

"We in Europe do not believe that a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact need inevitably to escalate from conventional to all-out nuclear war. There are strong constraints on both sides against resorting to nuclear exchanges. But, this very fact emphasizes our need to build up and maintain strong conventional fighting forces—forces that can hold the line while we reinforce, mobilize, and give people time to talk. . . .

"We will continue to seek—and find—solutions to our U.S. and NATO problems in Europe, and we can use all the help we can get. . . . Our Nation's security is unequivocally involved in the security of Europe—that the defense of North America starts at the Iron Curtain."

The general concluded: "The NATO Alliance has been successful in Europe for a generation. The relative military and political stability that has been achieved is, in fact, one of the elements that has, paradoxically, produced a euphoria of detente. But the threat is still present and growing. . . . In this area, we still have most at issue—and most at stake.

"We in Europe recognize that the involvement in Southeast Asia has, of necessity, placed us in a relatively lower priority for resources . . . and we have paid a price in our readiness posture.

"Today we are prepared to fulfill our NATO commitments. At the same time, we find the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact nations increasing—substantially and dangerously. It is my firm belief that support for this essential U.S. contribution to NATO in the European theater should be high on the priority list of this Congress.

"We recognize that," he said, "from a practical standpoint, we cannot recoup overnight; that our present situation has resulted over a six-year period; but now is the time for the turning point, for action to begin to increase the readiness of our forces."

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